The Asian crisis, which broke out a decade ago, taught observers many lessons but also raised questions that either have uncertain answers or have yet to be answered at all, says Moody's Investors Service in a new report as part of its "International Policy Perspectives" series. The report, entitled "The Asian crisis: what we know, what we think we know and what we do not know", presents Moody's perspective on how the crisis has added to global knowledge of economics and where it has not allowed firm conclusions to be drawn.
"Ten years after the Asian crisis, there are at least three key issues on which we still do not know enough. The understanding of these issues has improved, but not to the point of providing full comfort in terms of risk assessment," says Pierre Cailleteau, Chief International Policy Analyst at Moody's and author of the report. "Probably the most critical issue is the difficulty of disentangling structural from cyclical factors. This stems from the fact that the world economy is undergoing a dramatic change -- probably one of the most important in its history."
Mr Cailleteau also argues that contagion dynamics remain largely undecipherable. This is an issue that interests investors, because of potentially unexpected portfolio correlations, as much as policymakers. In a way, the reflection on contagion prompted a look at the demand side of the capital market -- who finances what and on which basis -- in addition to the more traditional approach based on the supply side -- i.e. the issuer of financial claims such as governments.
The third issue flagged in the Moody's report as one where knowledge is currently insufficient is political risk. "A final lesson is that we don't know how to anticipate political crises. More precisely, while the risk of political turbulence can be foreseen, the unfolding scenario of a political crisis is unpredictable," advises Mr Cailleteau, who notes that this is more a constant in history than a product of globalisation.Moody's new report cites the "lessons that we think we know" as the realisation (i) that current account imbalances raise concerns, although they do not always end in disaster; (ii) that periods of boisterous financial liberalisation often, but not always, lead to problems; and (iii) that local currency debt is generally "better" than foreign currency debt.
"All in all, the situation of emerging market economies has improved considerably since the 1997 crisis, spurred by a strengthening of liquidity positions, the diffusion of a risk management culture -- practices have improved, broadened and converged across the financial industry and the public sector -- and an intensification in trade integration," says Mr Cailleteau. "These are the three lessons that have been learnt. The repeat of an Asian crisis is thus very unlikely and it will require more imagination to determine how and when risks will coalesce and degenerate into the next crisis.